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Greenberg and Jones: The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent, vol.

In telling the fascinating story of
DesRon 21 and its crew, Wukovits
demonstrates without a doubt that, as
a scholar and historian, he rivals such
naval historians of the Pacific theater
as James Hornfischer and Samuel
Eliot Morison. The book might have
included more maps to ensure correct
and continued orientation to the
events, places, movements, and battles
it describes. Nonetheless, Wukovits has
compiled an excellent study of DesRon
21, one that is demonstrably the product
of lengthy research into wartime naval
records; academic research; and personal
oral interviews with those DesRon 21
crewmembers still living, which bring
an intimate and personal quality to
this historical study. In sum, Tin Can
Titans unquestionably is a must-have
addition for any armchair World War II
history buff or student of naval history.
BLAKE I. CAMPBELL

The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear
Deterrent, by Matthew Jones. Vol. 1, From the VBomber Era to the Arrival of Polaris, 1945–1964.
London: Routledge, 2017. 547 pages. $155.
The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear
Deterrent, by Matthew Jones. Vol. 2, The Labour
Government and the Polaris Programme, 1964–
1970. London: Routledge, 2017. 559 pages. $155.

No inquiry into British nuclear history can be undertaken in isolation
from the presence of an intimate U.S.
involvement. It therefore is worth
taking notice of the publication of the
two-volume Official History of the UK
Strategic Nuclear Deterrent. Matthew
Jones, professor of international history
at the London School of Economics,
was granted unprecedented access
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to hitherto unavailable materials
to produce this official history.
At the beginning of both volumes,
Professor Jones graciously pays tribute to
the pioneers of British nuclear historiography, Professor Margaret Gowing and
her associate Lorna Arnold. Gowing,
official historian of the United Kingdom
(U.K.) Atomic Energy Authority and
professor of the history of science at
Oxford, authored the studies that set the
scholarly standard: Britain and Atomic
Energy, 1939–1945 and, a decade later,
her two-volume Independence and
Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy,
1945–1952. Arnold assisted Gowing,
then in 2001 published her own book,
Britain and the H-bomb. Jones’s two
new volumes are worthy sequels.
America’s initial monopoly over the
atomic bomb fed the British sense of
technological exclusion. Determined
then to “go it alone,” Britain asserted an
initial nuclear doctrine of sovereign and
independent control over its nuclear
weapons. It was only after Britain had
demonstrated a unilateral mastery of
thermonuclear weapons development
in May 1957 that the United Kingdom
was granted access to specific U.S.
nuclear weapons technologies. For
Jones, the ensuing 1958 U.S.-U.K.
mutual-defense agreement remains
“one of the most remarkable examples
of pooling of sensitive national security
information by two sovereign states,
and has rightly been seen as one of the
fundamental pillars of the post-war
Anglo-American relationship.”
The United Kingdom’s capacity to
inflict assured nuclear destruction,
independent of the United States,
allowed it to behave as a “second centre
of decision.” In this position, Britain
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secured the ability not only to “leverage”
the United States politically but also
to command a seat at the geostrategic
“top table.” Jones presents the Skybolt
missile crisis of 1962 as an example of
this nuclear-based political leverage over
the United States. Aiming at updating
Britain’s nuclear deterrent, the United
States promised delivery of the Skybolt
system. A nuclear, standoff, air-toground missile, Skybolt was designed to
penetrate Soviet airspace in the face of
an increasing Soviet antiballistic-missile
(ABM) capability. When President
Kennedy abruptly canceled the agreement in November 1962, he did so
ostensibly on technical grounds. In truth,
the United States opposed, on political
grounds, any extension to the life of the
U.K. nuclear deterrent. Seeing through
this ruse, Prime Minister Macmillan
was instrumental in resolving the crisis
at the Nassau conference in December
1962—by hoisting Kennedy’s policy
on its own petard. The United States
was forced to concede the nature of
its opposition to sharing Skybolt, and
instead to offer a replacement—which
paradoxically became Britain’s secondgeneration nuclear deterrent: the Polaris
missile system. Not only had Britain’s
first-generation deterrent not been
curbed, but the United States in fact had
become father to a second generation.
Volume 2 brings with it the advent of
a new ministry in 1964, led by Harold
Wilson and the Labour Party. The
necessity for a Polaris Improvement
Program takes center stage in this
volume, since the Polaris A-3 missile
was becoming obsolescent, just as the
second-generation Polaris system was
coming on line. There is a fascinating
portrayal of the Whitehall bureaucracy
at work in the constant race to maintain
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a semblance of qualitative nuclear
parity with the United States.
In the wake of the U.S. shift to the
Poseidon’s advanced technology of
the multiple independently targetable
reentry vehicle (MIRV), Britain under
Wilson’s aegis set off alone to begin
exploitation of an intermediate technology, Antelope, that the United States had
developed but later abandoned in favor
of MIRVs. The climax of the U.K. Polaris
Improvement Program was reached with
Chevaline, a unique configurational
change to alter the front end of the
Polaris missile, thereby rendering it
all but invulnerable to interception by
deployed Soviet ABMs. But the history
of that program will have to await the
projected third volume in this series.
Meantime, Professor Jones has
written an excellent description of
Britain’s quest for a sovereign and
independent strategic nuclear deterrent.
Completely mastering his sources,
Jones has produced a compelling work
of lasting significance. He has come
full circle, following in the footsteps
of his larger-than-life role models,
Margaret Gowing and Lorna Arnold.
MYRON A. GREENBERG

Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a
Complex World, by Stanley McChrystal, with
Tantum Collins, David Silverman, and Chris
Fussell. New York: Portfolio/Penguin, 2015. 290
pages. $29.95.

During the years he spent hunting
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and battling
the forces of Al Qaeda in the streets
and deserts of Iraq, General Stanley
McChrystal turned the Joint Special
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